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THE PROBLEMS OF HOST-GUEST CASES




The evolution of the legal relationship in automobile host and guest
cases has been gradual. Whether it, like matrimony, has been for better
or for worse I shal not attempt to answer, but I will feel that my efforts
have been well rewarded if my remarks are provocative and serve to
stimulate some thought on the subject.
In my approach to the problem, I hope my criticisms will be con-
structive, bearing in mind that the men who have made up our Supreme
Court for the past forty-five years have had to struggle with the prob-
lem from its inception just as the manufacturers of the automobile
itself which gave rise to the problem had to labor in improving the
product.
The reported cases evidence the struggle within the Court itself in
an attempt to arrive at a sound public policy in respect to the determina-
tion of this particular class of litigation.
The first reported case by our Supreme Court involving an action by
a guest against a third person was Lauson v. Fond du Lac" decided
forty-three years ago. It held that an occupant of a private automobile
cannot recover for an injury caused by a defect in the highway if the
negligence of the host-driver was imputed to the guest. For reasons un-
explained by the decision, counsel for the plaintiff did not bring an
action by the guest against the host. At least that issue is not raised by
the decision.
In the case of Steinkrause v. Eckstein2 the rule laid down in the
Lauson case was followed, and I quote:
"It is the accepted law in this jurisdiction that any occupant
of a private vehicle such as the automobile in this case is barred
from recovering from a third person for injuries caused by such
person's negligence if the driver of such vehicle is also properly
chargeable with negligence proximately contributing to the acci-
dent." 3
* Adapted from an address given before the Board of Circuit Judges of Wis-
consin.
** LL.B. Marquette University 1930; Lecturer in Law, Marquette University Law
School.
'Lauson v. Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N.W. 629 (1909).
2 Steinkrause v. Eckstein, 170 Wis. 487, 175 N.W. 488 (1920).
3 Ibid., 175 N.W. at p. 989.
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It appears that this is the first case involving alleged intoxication on
the part of one of the drivers, and the Court, speaking through Justice
Eschweiler, makes this interesting comment:
" * * no precise definition of what is intoxication is made
by the statute, nor will we undertake in that behalf to do more
than say that it is evidently intended that the fact must appear
that the driver's indulgence in the use of intoxicating liquors
was such as to result in an appreciable interference with the ex-
ercise by him of ordinary care in the management of such veh-
icle.
"In Briffitt v. State, 58 Wis. 39, 43, 16 N.W. 39, this court de-
clared that judicial knowledge would be taken of such a matter
of common knowledge as that beer and other alcoholic liquors are
intoxicating.
"It also follows as a corollary that the consumption of suffi-
cient quantities thereof will produce intoxication. But in the
quantitative analysis that must be made in cases like the present
there are always two elements: the constant or intoxicant and the
ever-variable, that is, the capacity and resisting power of the in-
diviual who imbibes. Of the constant we are bound to know, but
of the variable, judicial knowledge, which at the best must be
assumed to be purely academic on such a subject, cannot be
charged upon the court as a matter of law.
'4
The foregoing quotation is worthy of note in connection with the
application which has been made by some judges in connection with the
urinalysis test. The common sense rule announced by the Court over
thirty years ago is still applicable today.
In Howe v. Corey5 a guest riding in an automobile which was
equipped with poor lights and a frosted windshield was injured when
the car collided with a train. The question of the liability of a gratui-
tous carrier to his invited guest in the absence of contributory negligence
on the part of the guest was not determined. In denying recovery to
the plaintiff because of his contributory negligence, the Court stated:
"It is the general rule that a passenger in an automobile is re-
quired to use the same care for his safety that a reasonably care-
ful person exercises under the same or similar circumstances.
The fact that he has not charge of the automobile as driver does
not absolve him from exercising care for his safety, though he is
not required to exercise the same care that is required of the
driver. The extent to which a guest may rely on the driver for
his protection against danger must in a measure depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case.
"'In general, the primary duty of caring for the safety of the
vehicle and its passengers rests upon the driver, and a mere gra-
tuitous passenger should not be found guilty of contributory
4Ibid., 175 N.W. at p. 990.
5Howe v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N.W. 791 (1920).
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negligence as a matter of law, unless he in some way actively
participates in the negligence of the driver, or is aware either
that the driver is incompetent or careless, or unmindful of some
danger known to or apparent to the passenger, or that the driver
is not taking proper precautions in approaching a place of danger,
and, being so aware, fails to warn or admonish the driver or to
take proper steps to preserve his own safety.' Carnegie v. G. N.
R. Co. 128 Minn. 14, 150 N.W. 164.
"'Ordinarily it is not the province or even proper for a guest to
attempt to direct the movements of the driver. The situation may
be different when he knows that the driver is operating the ma-
chine in a careless manner, or if he has knowledge of some danger
which is not known or obvious to the driver.' See cases in Huddy,
Automobiles (5th ed.) sec. 690.
"Negligence of a guest may be inferred from action or omis-
sion to act, speaking or omitting to speak, respecting the duty
under all the circumstances. Accepting the hospitality of his
friend does not excuse him from the duty of acting for his own
safety as a reasonably prudent person would under like circum-
stances."
The Court further states:
"The facts, circumstances, and conditions thus disclosed and
the other evidence in the case show without dispute that the
plaintiff, to all intents and purposes, acquiesced in the manner
the car was being driven by Corey and that he did nothing to pro-
tect himself from the imminent dangers in approaching the Soo
tracks crossing in the manner they did, and of which he was as
fully apprised as Corey, nor did he do anything to ascertain
whether or not Corey was keeping a lookout for these dangers.
To permit Corey to proceed in this reckless manner without
remonstrance, in the light of plaintiff's knowledge of the probable
dangers at the Soo crossing, amounts to acquiescence in Corey's
conduct and an assumption of the hazards and dangers incident
thereto. It is wholly inconsistent with the idea that he exercised
such reasonable care as the ordinarily prudent person exercises
under like or similar circumstances. There is but one inference
permissible to be drawn from the facts shown by the evidence,
namely, that plaintiff was guilty of a want of ordinary care on
the occasion in question and that such want of care contributed
to produce the injury complained of."6
The Court continued to struggle with contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. Prior to the passage of our Comparative Negli-
gence Statute, the distinction was of little consequence, but with the
passage of that Act the matter of comparison became of vital im-
portance, and the distinction between the two likewise became extreme-
ly important as shall be pointed out later in this discussion.
, Ibid., 179 N.W. at p. 792.
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Reiter v. Grober/ is a landmark case because it overruled Prideaux
v. Mineral Point," in so far as it imputed the negligence of the driver of
a private vehicle to an occupant therein. The doctrine previously fol-
lowed was artificial and unfair, and in the Reiter case, counsel for the
plaintiff were obviously overreaching when they attempted to extend
the doctrine so as to make a guest occupant liable to third persons for
the negligence of the driver. The Court, in refusing to accept plaintiff's
theory, stated:
"To extend the doctrine to that degree would make a guest
in a private conveyance an insurer of third persons against the
negligence of the driver. Instead of being invested with the lia-
bilities of a guest he would shoulder those of a master. We not
only decline to so extend the rule of Prideaux v. Mineral Point,
43, Wis. 513, in so far as it imputes the negligence of the driver
of a private vehicle to an occupant therein, but we take this oc-
casion to expressly overrule it. We do so now the more readily
because no litigant before the court suffers by reason of the
repudiation of the doctrine.""
In Brubaker v. Iowa County,10 the Court extends the rule laid down
in the Reiter case and sets forth that from the mere marital relationship
existing between husband and wife, the contributory negligence of the
husband cannot be imputed to the wife. Thus, where a wife was travel-
ing with her husband and they were not engaged in a joint enterprise
and she had no direction or control over his movements, she was not
chargeable with his negligence acts. However, the Court does go on to
make this interesting comment:
"If the occupant sees the driver is driving at a dangerous rate
of speed or in violation of the law, reasonable care would re-
quire that the passengers protest."'"
In Oshea v. Lavoy12 a guest was denied any recovery when the acci-
dent resulted due to the upsetting of the automobile because of a de-
fective spring even though it was a secondhand automobile and the
springs were repaired with old parts.
In the case just mentioned, Justice Owen comments on the relation-
ship of host and guest, and his remarks are worthy of our considera-
tion. He commented:
"The automobile is an instrumentality of recent creation
which has rapidly established itself in the desires of the people.
No other agency has so effectively appealed to their favor. Noth-
ing contributes so much to the comfort and pleasure, the welfare
7 Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493. 181 N.W. 739 (1921).
s Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1877).
9 Sppra. note 7, 181 N.W. at p. 740.
10 Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 WNis. 574, 183 N.W. 690 (1921).
11 Ibid., 183 N.W. at p. 693.12 O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N.V'. 525 (1921).
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and happiness of the family. It has given a new idea to distances
and materially enlarged the orbit of individual existence. It af-
fords recreation which appeals to every member of the family
and pleasures which may be indulged by the family unit. It is a
minister of health as well as pleasure. It makes the fresh air of
the country available to the citizens of the congested city and
brings the pleasures of the city within the reach of the rural
inhabitant. There are many who cannot afford to own an auto-
mobile. There are few who do not covet the comfort, pleasure,
recreation afforded thereby. It is an act of kindness and con-
sideration for the owner of a car to lend its comfort and pleasure
through an invitation extended to his less fortunate neighbor for
a ride in the country, to join a picnic party, or to enjoy an eve-
ning at the theater in the near-by city. This is a species of hos-
pitality which should be encouraged rather than discouraged, and
the law should not couple with this friendly act a duty which
makes its exercise an unreasonable hazard. On the other hand,
he who takes his friends and neighbors into his automobile places
them in a high-powered, swiftly-moving vehicle attended with
great danger unless handled and operated with a requisite degree
of care. He must realize that he has voluntarily received into
his keeping the lives and safety of his passengers, and he should
not be permitted to trifle therewith or to renounce all responsi-
bility in such respect."'13
The Court struggled with the question of the legal relationship ex-
isting in host and guest cases and comments upon whether it should
adopt the rule existing in some jurisdiction of finding a host liable only
for gross negligence, or whether the relationship of licensor and licensee
exists so that the host is liable only for active negligence which increases
the hazard or creates a new one. The Court, after discussing the
matter at length, finally concluded that because the question of liability
of the host-driver to his invited guest for negligent management of the
vehicle was not before it, it would render no decision on that point.
Hbwever, before concluding the Court makes this interesting comment:
"We can see no difference between an invitation extended by
a person to dine with him and an invitation extended to ride with
him. It has been held by this court that in the former case the
legal relation arising was that of licensor and lisensee. Greenfield
v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834. It follows that the same
relation arises in the latter case, which conclusion is supported by
authorities already cited. Whether or not the established rules
of liability existing between licensor and licensee are applicable
in the matter of the management of the automobile, they plainly
are applicable so far as the condition of the automobile is con-
cerned. According to those rules the guest accepts the premises
of his host as he finds them, subject only to the limitation that
'in Ibid., 185 N.W. at p. 526.
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the licensor must not set a trap or be guilty of active negligence
which contributed to the injury."'' 4
The foregoing covers the historical background giving rise to the
questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk in host and
guest cases, but in subsequent decisions the Court continued to struggle
with the problem of whether assumption of risk and contributory neg-
ligence were one and the same or whether they were separate and dis-
tinct. In our consideration of the problem, it is well to consider the
elements which go toward establishing what constitutes assumption of
risk and contributory negligence.
In order to establish assumption of risk, three elements must be
present:
1. A hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the guest;
2. Knowledge and appreciation of the hazard by the guest; and
3. Acquiescence or a willingness to proceed in the face of danger.'5
In Osborne v. Montgomery the Court said:
"Negligence in law is not mere carelessness, but is careless
conduct under such circumstances that an ordinarily prudent per-
son would anticipate some injury to another as a reasonable
probable result thereof."' 6
One would think that the foregoing definition would apply in its
entirety to contributory negligence. However, our Court in Scory v.
LaFavey modified the definition by stating:
"It must be borne in mind that contribution to the injury to
the plaintiff, not contribution to the accident that caused his in-jury, is the only contribution that is essential to contributory neg-
ligence. Thus one who carelessly takes a position of danger is
guilty of contributory negligence, although his conduct has noth-
ing to do with the accident caused by the negligence of another
in which he sustains his injuries.""'
The problem which seems to have caused the greatest trouble has
been the application of these rules to the particular case and the ques-
tion as to what distinction, if any, should be made between the two. The
best discussion will be found in the Scory case, supra. In the concurring
opinion of Justice Fowler, the Court refers to an opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Co.' 9
14 Ibid., 185 N.W. at p. 528.
'2 Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N.W. 784 (1929) ; Sommerfield v. Flory,
198 Wis. 163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929); Page v. Page, 199 Wis. 641, 227 N.W. 233(1929) ; Brockhaus v. Neuman, 201 Wis. 57, 228 N.W. 477 (1930) ; Knipfer v.
Shaw, 210 Wis. 617, 246 N.W. 328 (1933).
16 Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223. 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
17 Scory v. La Fave, 215 Wis. 21, 254 N.W. 643 (1934).
18 Ibid., 254 N.W. at p. 650.
19 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Co., 205 U.S. 1 (1906).
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" '* * * the practical difference of the two ideas is in the de-
gree of their proximity to the particular harm. The preliminary
conduct of getting into the dangerous employment or relation is
said to be accompanied by assumption of the risk. The act more
immediately leading to a specific accident is called negligent. But
the difference between the two is one of degree rather than of
kind.' "20
In concluding his opinion, Justice Fowler continues, and it must be
assumed that his language is the language of the entire Court except
where it may have been subsequently modified, and I quote:
"It is to be borne in mind that the thing assumed in assump-
tion of risk by a plaintiff is risk of injury to himself, and that a
plaintiff's subjecting himself unreasonably to a risk of injury has
always been, and I submit always will be, contributory negligence
if injury results from the act from which risk of injury has been
unreasonably assumed. To my mind attempt to apply the as-
sumption of risk doctrine in host and guest cases was entirely
unnecessary. The same result follows from applying the doctrine
of contributory negligence irrespective of that of assumption of
risk. We say a guest assumes the risk of injury from negligent
conduct of his host to which he knowingly and voluntarily sub-
jects himself. The host in such case is negligent because he has
done something that an ordinarily careful and prudent driver
would not do. If the host is negligent under a given state of facts,
the guest is negligent under the same state of facts for volun-
tarily and knowingly subjecting lhimself to the dangers incident
to the host's conduct, and the guest is precisely as negligent as
is the host. The guest subjects himself to precisely the same
danger to which the host subjects himself. It follows our com-
parative negligence statute that the guest's negligence is not less
than that of the host and he cannot recover from the host."2'
So that there will be no misunderstanding as to the foregoing, I
want to bring to your attention the fact that our Court distinctly rec-
oguizes that assumption of risk and contributory negligence are separate
legal concepts.
In Storlie v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 22 in which de-
cision the Scory case is referred to, Justice Fairchild, writing the opin-
ion for the Court, states:
"Their assumption of these risks would completely bar the
guests from recovering from the host, and it would be unneces-
sary to consider whether or not the evidence sustained a finding
of contributory negligence on the part of the guests. However, it
may be well to point out, in view of the thought expressed by the
trial court in its memorandum decision, that assumption of risk
2o Supra, note 17, 254 N.W. at p. 649.




and contributory negligence are distinct legal concepts. Assump-
tion of risk is based on a consent to the prevailing and casual cir-
cumstances. Such consent may or may not evince a failure to
exercise ordinary care. Contributory negligence, of course, al-
ways involves a failure to exercise ordinary care under the cir-
sumstances, including the duty owed by the actor to others. Since
assumption of risk is not necessarily negligence, it is misleading
to speak of adding it to contributory negligence, as the trial court
did here, to determine that the negligence of the guests was at
least equal to the negligence of the driver and therefore pre-
cluded recovery by the guests. The action fails because the cause
alleged is not proved.12 3
The picture became more confused following the decisions handed
down in Koepke v. Miller, 24 and State ex rel. Litzen v. Dillett.25 In the
former case a plaintiff was permitted a full recovery where the host was
negligent as to lookout, although it was conceded that the guest assumed
the risk incident to the icy condition of the street, the frosted condition
of the windshield and side windows, the host-driver's intoxication, if
any, and the lateness of the hour as affecting loss of sleep.
In the latter case the plainstiff-guest was permitted to recover, al-
though the jury found that he had assumed the risk of his host's negli-
gent lookout but not as to the host's causal negligence as to the position
of the car on the road and as to control.
By the rulings in these two cases, the host is penalized without any
relief despite the finding of assumption of risk on the part of the guest.
For all practical purposes, these cases eliminated the defense of assump-
tion of risk. If we were to stop there, we would need to consider the
question of assumption of risk only in such cases in which the guest
assumed the risk as to all items of negligence. It is my judgment that
the Court has veered away from the doctrine laid down in the fore-
going cases, and I shall discuss at this time the cases modifying the rule.
In Gilbertson v. Gmeinder26 the Court said:
"* * * if Gmeinder was drunk, then as a matter of law Gil-
bertson, having been with him all during the time he was drink-
ing, would assume the risk flowing therefrom.
2 7
Likewise, in the very recent case of Watland v. Farmers Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,28 it was held that a drinking-partner guest
assumes the risk of injury incidental to the host's drunken driving, and
where such guest voluntarily rides with the host, regardless of the host's
2 Ibid., 28 N.W. 2d at p. 922.
24 Koepke v. Miller, 241 Wis. 501, 6 N.W.(2d) 670 (1942).
25 State ex. rel. Litzen v. Dillett, 242 Wis. 107, 7 N.W. (2d) 599 (1943).
26 Gilbertson v. Gmeinder, 252 Wis. 210, 31 N.W. 2d 599 (1943).
27 Ibid., 31 N.W. 2d at p. 161.
2 sWatland v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 261 Wis. 477, 53
N.W. 2d 193 (1952).
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intoxicating condition, the guest assumes the risk of injury caused by
the host's negligence in operating the host's automobile whether such
negligence is in respect to control or lookout or being on the wrong side
of the highway, and whether such negligence is temporary or is part of
a course of driving conduct which would have warned the guest that the
host was in no condition to drive.
In Wheeler v. Rural Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.,29 decided at
the same term as the Watland case, the Court reviewed the law of as-
a course of driving conduct which would have warned the guest that the
that:
"A host driving a car in which his guest is riding is, in law,
required to exercise such skill and judgment as he possesses in
the management of the car with relation to the laws of the road
and the exercise of ordinary care for the safety of his guest. 'A
guest takes the host as he finds him, so far as skill and judgment
are concerned, but he is entitled to assume upon entering the car
that the host will obey the laws of the road.' Olson v. State Farm
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1947), 252 Wis. 37, 40, 30 N.W. (2d)
196. See Poneitowcki v. Harres (1930), 200 Wis. 504, 509, 228
N.W. 126. It has been held that the established rule as to assump-
tion of risk by a guest '"should not be extended to situations
where a host is inattentive and careless in making observations,
to situations where his faulty judgment is based upon faulty
premises proceeding from careless observation, or to hasty judg-
ments resulting from careless observations."' Rudolph v. Ketter
(1940), 223 Wis. 329, 333, 289 N.W. 674. See Harter v. Dick-
man (1932), 209 Wis. 283, 288, 245 N.W. 157; Goehmann v.
National Biscuit Co. (1931), 204 Wis. 427, 430, 235 N.W. 792.
In the case last referred to, it is said, 'The momentary manage-
ment of the car should be left to the driver.' In Poneitowcki v.
Harres, supra, it is said that it is also the duty of the host 'to ex-
ercise ordinary care not to increase the danger or add a new one
to those which she (the guest) assumed when she entered the
car.' 2,)0
In Johnsen v. Pierce,31 decided November 5, 1952, you will find a
situation that presents practically all of the problems which can arise in
a two car collision involving joint venture, comparative negligence, and
assumption of risk. In this case the plaintiff and her son were making
a trip in their jointly-owned automobile to bring a second son from his
army base to his home. As a result of a collision with the defendant
Pierce, the mother was injured. She sued Pierce who in turn impleaded
her son. The trial court found as a matter of law that at the time of
the collision the plaintiff and her son were engaged in a joint enterprise.
The jury found that both Pierce and the impleaded defendant Johnsen
9 Wheeler v. Rural Mutual Casualty Company, 261 Wis. 528, 53 N.W. 2d (1952).
30 Ibid., 53 N.W. 2d at p. 191.
31 Johnson v. Peirce, 262 Wis. 367, 55 N.W. 2d 394 (1952).
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were causally negligent in equal degree and that the plaintiff had as-
sumed the risk of her son's failure to exercise due care. Under the
circumstances, the plaintiff was denied recovery from both defendants
because the negligence of the son was imputed to her, and such negli-
gence, not being of a lesser degree than that of the defendant Pierce,
she could not recover against him.
As between joint adventurers, the negligence of the one joint ad-
venturer is not imputed to the other except in actions against third per-
sons, but as between joint adventurers, the doctrine of assumption of
risk applies upon the same basis that it does in host-guest cases, and the
jury having found that the plaintiff had assumed the risk, she was de-
nied any recovery against her son.
In Lepak v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,3 2 the trial
court held as a matter of law, which ruling was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court, that the causal negligence of the plaintiff was as a matter
of law at least equal to the causal negligence, if any, of the defendant.
The facts disclose that the plaintiff who was seated in a loaded dump
truck with the defendant's driver and who knew that the defendant was
operating the hoist and would start the truck forward with a jerk had
reason to apprehend that he would subject himself to danger if he left
the truck under the circumstances and without telling the defendant who
was engaged in the operation of the truck and its unloading but who
nevertheless started to leave the truck and was thrown to the ground
and injured.
I have discussed the legal principles and their application to particu-
lar facts, but the problem which judges face in the presentation of the
particular cases to the jury has not been considered. I shall do so at
this time.
In Harter v. Dickman,3 3 the trial judge submitted the following
question:
"'Q. 1. Was the defendant, Russell Dickman, negligent in
the operation of his automobile at and just previous to the time
of the accident in respect to-
"'(A) As to control?
"'(B) In respect to the control at which he drove so as to
increase the danger to the plaintiff beyond which the plaintiff
ought to have reasonably expected in riding with the defend-
ant ?' "34
The question was severely criticized by the Supreme Court, and the
Court then suggested that the matter be submitted as follows:
32 Lepak v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 262 Wis. 1, 53 N.W.
2d 710 (1952).
3 Harter v. Dickman, 209 Wis. 283, 245 N.W. 157 (1932).
4 Ibid., 245 N.W. at p. 157.
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" 'Did the defendant, just prior to the accident, fail to ex-
ercise ordinary care not to increase the danger assumed by the
plaintiff upon entering defendant's automobile-
"'(a) in respect to the control of his automobile?'
In the recent case of John.sen v. Pierce, 3" the question of assumption
of risk was submitted as follows, and it was not criticized by the Su-
preme Court:
"'Question 5: Was the defendant Robert Johnsen negligent
so as to increase the danger which the plaintiff Tressie Johnsen
assumed when she entered the car, or so as to create a new
danger, as to: . . .
"'(b) With respect to Robert Johnsen's management and
control of his car just prior to the first collision?
" 'Answer: Yes.
"'Qestion 6: If you answer any of the subdivisions of Ques-
tion 5 "yes," then answer the corresponding subdivision of this
question: Did defendant Robert Johnsen fail to exercise the skill
and judgment he possessed just prior to the first collision?...
"'(b) With respect to the management and control of his
car ?
"'Answer: Yes.'
"By its answer to Question 8 the jury found such negligences
were causal. Question 9 dealt with 5 (b) and 6 (a) concerning
speed, not material here. Then the verdict asked:
"'Question 10: If you answer Questions 5 (b) and 6 (b)
and 8 "Yes," then answer this question: Did plaintiff Tressie
Johnsen assume the risk of this negligence by defendant Robert
Johnsen?
"'Answer: Yes.' -)7
I personally feel that both forms just referred to are cumbersome
and can be simplified, and for your consideration I submit that the ques-
tion be set forth in a special verdict substantially as follows:
Did the defendant, just prior to the accident, increase the danger
assumed by the plaintiff upon entering defendant's automobile-
A. As to speed?
B. As to lookout?
C. As to management and control?-or
D. Such other items as the evidence submitted raises jury issues
in respect to the defendant-driver's negligence.
The contributory negligence of the guest may also be in issue and,
if it is, I suggest that it be submitted substantially as follows:
35Ibid., 245 N.W. at p. 159.
36 Supra, note 31.
37Sppra, note 31, 55 N.W. 2d at p. 398.
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Was the plaintiff negligent at or just previous to the time of the
accident in respect to-
A. Failing to warn the driver?
B. The position he or she took in or on the automobile?
C. Keeping a proper lookout?
D. Such other item or items as the evidence submitted raises jury
issues in respect to the guest's negligence.
In conclusion, I wish to point out that in my judgment, from a study
of the cases in Wisconsin, we can proceed upon the legal theory that
it is well engrafted in our common law that:
1. Assumption of risk is a complete defense wherever the negli-
gence of the host-driver, which negligence is assumed by the guest,
causally contributes to the accident.
2. That contributory negligence is separate and distinct from
assumption of risk and that negligence on the part of a guest is subject
to the limitations of the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Law.
3. That the principles laid down by our Supreme Court in host
and guest cases are sound and are not in need of change, and that the
only problem which exists is the matter of interpretation as it applies
to the facts in each particular case. That is a problem which will
continue to be presented as long as we have automobiles.
[Vol. 37
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